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Statement of Facts: 
In the early of December 4, 2013, Appellant Mrs. Jonna Bobeck, got herselfand her 
four ( 4) year old son ready for bed. It was just Mrs. Bobeck and son at home at the time, as her 
husband, David Bobeck, was working a 24-hour shift with Lewiston Fire Department. Mrs. 
Bobeck took her prescribed nightly medications and climbed into bed with her 4 year old son. At 
approximately 9:40pm, Mrs. Bobeck was involved in an automobile accident at the intersection of 
13th Street and Idaho street Prior to the accident, Mrs. Bobeck's vehicle struck a power pole. After 
the accident at the intersection, Mrs. Bobeck' s vehicle continued at a creeping speed and came to rest 
after striking Officer Eylar's patrol car on or about street At the time of the accidents, Mrs. 
Bobeck was wearingjusther bathrobe, underwear and slippers. R., p. 211, LI. 2-4. Tr., p. 28, LL 2-4. 
Her 4 old son was also in his pajamas and strapped into his car seat in the back of Mrs. 
Bobeck's car. Mrs. Bobeck \Vas taken by ambulance to St. Joseph's Medical Center for treatment 
from her injuries. While in a semi-unconscious and sleepy state, Idaho State Police Trooper Travis 
Hight read the ALS advisory form to Mrs. Bobeck prior to Mrs. Bobeck's blood draw to check for 
intoxicating substances. R., p. 197, LL 7-8. Mrs. Bobeck did not respond or interact at all with 
Trooper Hight; rather she drifted in and out of sleep with her eyes closed. R., p. 201, LL 1-8. R., p. 
212, LL 1-25. R., p. 213, LL 1-9. Mrs. Bobeck has no memory of the events that occurred after 
climbing into bed with her son, the evening of December 4, 2013 until waking up in bed with her 
husband early in the morning of December 5, 2013. R., p. 217, LI. 13-25. R., p. 218, LL 8-10. 
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The results of the evidentiary blood test obtained from Mrs. Bobeck were positive for 
Zolpidem and Trazodone, both of which Mrs. Bobeck has a lawful prescription for. Mrs. Bobeck's 
driver's license was suspended pursuant to Idaho Code § I 8-8002A( 4 ). She requested a hearing 
before an ITO hearing officer pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), contending I moper I ravis 
Hight had not properly advised her of the effect of a refusal. Taking into account the evidence 
presented at the hearing, including the DVD recording of the incident. the hearing officer issued an 
order. including findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding there was substantial evidence 
that the proper procedures had been followed and upholding the administrative suspension of Mrs. 
Bobeck's driver's license. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the record contained substantial 
evidence to support the hearing officer·s determination that Trooper Hight complied with the 
requirement to give information at the time of evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances pursuant to Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(2) where he read the advisory 
form to Mrs. Bobeck while she was asleep? 
B) Whether the District Court erred in finding that it was unnecessary to decide whether 
or not Mrs. Bobeck was informed pursuant to Idaho Code Section l 8-8002A(2) because compliance 
with the statute \Vas immaterial when it misapplied its cited case law? 
C) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the implied consent statute 
applicable to when the statute was found unconstitutional? 
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ARGUMENT 
Standard On Review: 
In general, judicial review of agency proceedings is limited. The Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act (hereinafter ·'ID APA'') governs the review of department 
suspend, disqualify. revoke, or restrict a person's driver's license. See I.C. 
to deny, cancel, 
49-201, 49-330, 
67-5201(2), 67-5270. The administrative license suspension statute, Idaho Code §18-8002A, 
requires the Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter "ITO") to suspend the driver's license of 
a driver who fails an alcohol concentration test administered by a enforcement officer. A hearing 
under l.C. § 18-8002A results in an "agency action" and is therefore governed by the IDAPA. LC. 
§ 67-5240. See also Druffel v. State. Dep't of Tramp .. 136 Idaho 853. 855, 41 741 (2002). 
An ITO administrative hearing officer's decision to uphold the suspension of a person's driver's 
license is subject to challenge through a petition for judicial review. LC. § l 8-8002A(8); Kane v. 
S'tate, Dep't of Tramp., 139 Idaho 586, 589, 83 P.3d 130. 1 (Ct.App.2003). 
Idaho Code §67-5279( I) sets out the scope of revie\v. Bennett v. State. ofTransp .. 14 7 
Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). As a practical matter, the reviewing court does not substitute 
its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. LC.§ 67-5279(1). 
Instead, the reviewing court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923. 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 ( l 998). In other 
words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is 
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
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competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine Cnty., ex rel. Bd. ofComm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 
357, 2 P.3d 738. 742 (2000). Put another way, the reviewing court may not set aside a Hearing 
Officer's findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record as 
a whole." Idaho Code §67-5279(3)(d); Afahurin v. State. Dep't o/Transp .. 140 Id. 65. 99 P.3d 125, 
(2004): See also Gibhar v. State, Dep't cfTransp .. 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006). 
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 
conclusion. Kinney v. Tuppenvare Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 ( 1990). Substantial 
evidence is more than a scintilla. but less than a preponderance. Id 
Under the IDAPA, an agency's decision may be overturned only where its findings: a) 
violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; c) or made 
upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record: ore) are 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC.§ 67-5279(3); Druffel v. 5,'tate, Dep't a/Tramp., 
136 Id. 853. 41 P Jd 739 (2002). The party attacking the agency's decision must first illustrate the 
agency erred in a manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3), and then establish that a substantial right 
has been prejudiced. Druf.fel at 855. At that point, the reviewing court is '·obliged to reverse a 
decision if substantial rights of an individual have been prejudiced because the administrative 
findings and conclusions are in violation of statutory provisions." Af·organ v. Idaho Dep't of Health 
and Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 9. 813 P.2d 345, 348 (I 991 ). The interpretation of a statute is an issue 
of law over which the revie\ving court exercises free review. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 
Idaho 353,358,986 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Ct.App.1999). 
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The Administrative License Suspension statute, LC. § 18-8002A, requires that the ITD 
suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a blood alcohol concentration test administered 
by a lavv enforcement officer. A person who has been notified of such an administrative license 
suspension may request a hearing before a hearing officer designated by the ITD to contest the 
suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she 
finds. by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds, 
enumerated in LC.§ 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e). for vacating the suspension. The burden of proof rests 
upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. § l 8-8002A(7): Kane, I 39 
Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. Once the driver has made an initial prima facie shmving of evidence 
proving some basis for vacating the suspension, the burden shifts to the state to rebut the evidence 
presented by the driver. See Kane, I 39 Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE HEARING OFFICER'S 
ORDER \VAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WHEN THE RECORD IS 
DEVOID OF FACTS TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT MRS. BOBECK WAS INFORMED 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION 18-8002A(2) \VHERE UNCONTROVERTED 
TESTIMONY \VAS PRESENTED THAT THE ALS ADVISORY FORM WAS READ TO 
MRS. BOBECK WHILE SHE WAS ASLEEP. 
Mrs. Bobeck, respectfully argues that her administrative license suspension should 
have been vacated. first by Hearing Examiner Skip Carter, and subsequently by the District Court 
upon judicial review. This argument is based on the facts that at her Administrative License 
Suspension (herein referred to as '·ALS") hearing Mrs. Bobeck established, by a preponderance of 
the evidence. that she was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as 
APPELLANrs BRIEF 6 
required in LC. § 18-8002A(2). Specifically, through the uncontroverted testimony of Mrs. Bobeck 
and two witnesses, the record contains substantial evidence that Officer Travis Hight failed to 
comply with Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2) when he read the ALS advisory form to her while she was 
asleep. This is in direct conflict with the findings of facts and conclusions of law entered by the 
hearing officer and sustained by the District Court upon judicial review. 
Under Idaho law, the evidentiary standard used for purposes of reviewing an agency's 
findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial and competent evidence, is 
"substantial and competent evidence'' which is defined as '·relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept to support a conclusion." lane Ranch P'ship v. City o/Sun Valley, 144 ldaho 584, 
590, 166 P.3d 374,380 (2007). A reasonable mind cannot accept the conclusion that Mrs. Bobeck 
was '·informed'' or ·'substantially informed'' of the contents of the ALS advisory when it was read 
to her while she was asleep. Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Mrs. 
Bobeck was anything but asleep. In fact_ the contention that Mrs. Bobeck was asleep is 
uncontroverted. The only evidence the hearing officer relied on to support his finding that Mrs. 
Bobeck was informed pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(2) vvas the fact Trooper Hight read Mrs. Bobeck 
the ALS advisory form. While there is no question that Officer Hight read the ALS form to Mrs. 
Bobeck, one cannot reasonably conclude based on the facts contained in the Record that Mrs. 
Bobeck was "substantially informed" as required under the statute. It is important to note that the 
hearing officer must consider all the evidence in the record after the hearing, including Mrs. 
Bobeck's testimony and the testimony of all witness, not just the officer's reports and other 
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documents. That simply wasn't done in this case. Thus, the hearing officer's determination that Mrs. 
Bobeck was substantially informed is absolutely not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence in the record. 
At issue here is \Vhether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the hearing 
officer's finding that Mrs. Bobeck was "infom1ed'' or "substantially informed" when the record 
contains uncontroverted evidence that Mrs. Bobeck was asleep when the ALS form was read to her. 
The simple answer to that question is "no" and, as such, the District Court was obligated to vacate 
Mrs. Bobeck' s license suspension. Instead, the District Court sustained the hearing officer· s decision 
and upheld the license suspension. Incredibly. the District Courf s result was despite its express 
acknowledgment and required use of the uncontroverted fact Mrs. Bobeck was asleep when the ALS 
form was read to her. It doesn't follow that the District Court could have properly found the record 
contained substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's decision and, therefore, based upon 
the reasons explained below, it erred. 
A. The Testimony Produced Only Uncontroverted Facts That Mrs. Bobeck Was 
Asleep When The ALS Advisory Form Was Read To Her. 
As well settled Idaho law, the burden of proof is on Mrs. Bobeck to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence. one of the statutorily enumerated grounds to vacate the suspension 
of her license under I.C. § l 8-8002A(7). Mrs. Bobeck presented evidence that her license suspension 
must be vacated because she was not informed ··of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required in subsection (2) of [LC. 18-8002A]." The evidence presented at Mrs. Bobeck's 
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administrative license suspension hearing included testimony from Idaho State Trooper Travis Hight, 
testimony from Mr. David Bobeck and Mrs. Bobeck's 0\\11 testimony. In pertinent part the hearing 
officer found Officer Hight administered the statutorily required information to Mrs. Bobeck in 
compliance \Vith the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement and 
ITO. R .. p. 14. However. Officer Hight testified that as he read Mrs. Bobeck the ALS form. Mrs. 
Bobeck did not respond and her eyes were closed some of the time '·as if she were sleeping." R., p. 
197, LL 4-8. R .. p. 20 I. Trooper Hight further testified that he was unable to determine Mrs. 
Bobeck· s level of consciousness. R .. p. 201. Mrs. Bobeck presented evidence that showed the A.LS 
form was read to her while she \Vas asleep. Mrs. Bobeck testified that she had absolutely no 
recollection of the events after her retreating to bed on December 4, 2013 and that her next memory 
occurred at 4:30a.m. on December 5, 2013. R., p. 218. David Bobeck testified to his extensive 
training as an EMS and through it his ability to assess the consciousness of a person. R .. pp. 207-208. 
lie testified further that he was with Mrs. Bobeck at the Emergency Room when Officer Hight was 
present and that Mrs. Bobeck \Vas not alert during the time Officer Hight read the ALS form to her. 
R .. p. 21 l. 212, 213. Mr. Bobeck clarified that Mrs. Bobeck \Vas mostly asleep. R .. p. 213; R., p. 
214. 
The hearing officer did not find Mr. Bobeck's testimony to lack credibility. The hearing 
ot1icer did not find Mrs. Bobeck's testimony to lack credibility. In fact the hearing officer did not 
address the testimony of any of the witnesses. Testimonial evidence is part of the record, and the 
record must be considered as a whole in order to see vvhether the result is supported by substantial 
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evidence. N. Frontiers, Inc. v. State ex rel. Cade, 129 Idaho 437. 440,926 P.2d 213,216 (Ct. App. 
1996). An agency's departures are vulnerable only if they fail to reflect attentive consideration to 
testimony evidence. Id The ALS case Bennett v. !TD is illustrative. In Bennett. the Court of Appeals 
held that evidence before the hearing officer did not support a finding that the officer complied with 
the proper monitoring period procedures, and the court upheld the district court's order vacating 
Bennett's license suspension. Id at 145, 206 P .3d at 509. There, the evidence presented to the 
hearing officer included the officer's affidavit and Ms. Bennett's testimony. Id at 143,206 P.3d at 
507. The affidavit was a computer-generated form and the only indication that the fifteen-minute 
observation procedure was complied with was a general statement saying, "The test(s) was/were 
performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004( 4) Idaho Code and the standards and 
methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." id Ms. Bennett's own testimony 
contradicted this statement, as she testified that she was coughing throughout the monitoring period 
and that the observing officer left the room twice during the observation period. Id As such, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the generic statement in the affidavit. when contradicted by specific 
and credible testimony that the observation period procedures were not complied with, was 
insufficient to support the hearing officer's conclusion that correct observation procedures were 
employed. id. at 145, 206 P.3d at 509. 
In this case, the agency hearing officer ·'failed to reflect attentive consideration to testimony 
evidence,·· wherein he did not outwardly reject the testimony of Mrs. Bobeck and her husband but 
rather failed to address the testimony all together. The testimony by Mrs. Bobeck and her husband 
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was specific and credible evidence that demonstrated a violation of proper procedures. Officer 
Hight's testimony, which provided only generalized statements regarding his reading the ALS form 
to Mrs. Bobeck and his admission that he didn't assess her level of consciousness or sleepiness. was 
insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed. Otlicer Hight merely read the 
ALS advisory form to a sleeping Mrs. Bobeck; he did not "inform" or "substantially inform'· Mrs. 
Bobeck as required pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(2). Collectively, the testimony of Mrs. Bobeck and 
her husband regarding the level of Mrs. Bobeck's consciousness was substantiated by Trooper 
Bight's testimony wherein it later contained similar and complimentary facts regarding the level of 
Mrs. Bobeck's consciousness. This testimony. then, would demonstrate that Officer Travis Hight 
failed to comply with Idaho Code § l 8-8002A, which required he give info1mation to Mrs. Bobeck 
to the extent that she "shall be informed'' of the information contained within paragraph (2) of LC. 
§ l 8-8002A. Proper advisement of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing was not 
followed. and therefore, Mrs. Bobeck was not advised in accordance with the requirements of LC. 
§ 18-8002A(2). This is uncontroverted. In fact the District Court correctly confirmed the 
uncontroverted nature of the evidence presented and directed that its legal analysis of the case must 
be based on facts that include Mrs. Bobeck vvas not fully conscious when the ALS form was read 
to her. R., p. 251.If the hearing officer had truly considered the testimony before him, there is no 
possible or rational way the hearing officer could have found Mrs. Bobeck vvas "informed" or 
"informed substantially" and asleep at the same time. "Informed" and "asleep" are mutually 
exclusive. Thus, due to the fact the testimonial evidence ofT rooper Hight and Mr. And Mrs. Bobeck 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 11-
is part of the record, and the record must be considered as a whole in order to determine if the 
findings of facts and conclusion of law are supported by substantial evidence, the hearing officer's 
finding that Mrs. Bobeck was informed pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A and in compliance with 
procedural standards is not supported by substantial evidence in the record where the hearing officer 
failed to reflect attentive consideration to testimony evidence. the testimony \Vas uncontroverted and 
the hearing officer's findings were in conflict with the uncontroverted nature of the evidence. As 
such. the hearing officer's decision was not based on substantial evidence in the record and was 
required to be vacated upon judicial review. 
B. "Informed" Does Not A,1ean ''Read" or "Substantially Provided" And 1U rs. Bobeck 
Was Not "Informed." 
The District Court missed the point with regard to Mrs. Bobeck·s argument In its Opinion 
and Order on Petition for Judicial Review, the District Court phrased the issue before it as whether 
a driver can be substantially informed if, at the time the ALS from is read to them, they lack 
sufficient awareness or capacity to comprehend the information being presented. R .. p. 251. This is 
in error as the District Court's interpretation of the issue presented by Mrs. Bobeck is beyond that 
which was stated in both Mrs. Bobeck's briefing and oral argument The correct issue, and the one 
again presented by Mrs. Bobeck in this appeal, is whether she (Mrs. Bobeck) was informed of the 
consequences if she refused to submit or complete the evidentiary testing requested, pursuant to LC. 
18-8002A(2), when Officer Hight read the ALS form to her while she was asleep. The District Court 
based its decision on a discussion of comprehension insomuch that it erroneously interpreted Mrs. 
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Bobeck's use of the word "informed·' to mean "comprehend." In its opinion, the District Court 
expressly confirms that Trooper Hight was obligated by statute to inform [Mrs. Bobeck] of the 
consequences of refusing or failing to complete evidentiary testing. R., p. 252. In the very next 
sentence, the District Court's error becomes clear whereby it states that Mrs. Bobeck's 
comprehension is irrelevant and that under the statute lav,i enforcement officers are not required to 
first ensure a driYer comprehends the infom1ation. Id Not only was comprehend nor comprehension 
not part of Mrs. Bobeck's argument, but neither tem1 is referenced in the text of the statute which 
formed the basis of Mrs. Bobeck's argument. As such, District Court erred in sustaining the hearing 
officer's final order because it's opinion seeks to resolve an issue not raised by Mrs. Bobeck and 
failed to issue a ruling on tv1rs. Bobcck's actual argument 
It is Mrs. Bobeck's position that she was not informed or substantially informed of the 
contents of the ALS advisory form because it \Vas read to her while she was asleep. Nowhere in 
Idaho case la\Y does it state, nor can it be inferred. that a driver is deemed to be "informed" of the 
information required to be given under I.C. § l 8-8002A(2) simply through an officer's act of reading 
the ALS form. Especially when the motorist is asleep or unconscious. In fact, the unambiguous 
language of statute uses the term '·informed'' and '·informed substantially" to describe the result of 
the law enforcement officer's reading of the ALS advisory form. LC. § l 8-8002A(2 ). If simply 
reading the ALS form was enough. the statute would have stated so. However. LC.§ l 8-8002A(2) 
does not use the word ··read.'' it used the word '·informed:' 
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The interpretation of a statute begins with its literal words. Those words must be given their 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Burnight. 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999). If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law 
as written, and \Vithout engaging in statutory construction. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. 
Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506(2011); In re Estate o/Peterson, 157 Idaho 827,340 
P.3d 1143, 1147 (2014). This Court has consistently held that, "where statutory language is 
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose 
of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co .. 123 
Idaho 665,667. 851 P .2d 961, 963 ( 1993 ). A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of 
more than one reasonable construction. Porter v. Bd. o/Trustees. Preston School Dist. No. 20 I, 141 
Idaho 11, 14. 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). Ambiguity is not established merely because different 
interpretations are presented by the parties. If that were the test then all statutes \Vhose meanings are 
contested in litigation could be considered ambiguous. ··[A] statute is not ambiguous merely because 
an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it."Bonner Cnty. v. Cunningham, 156 
Idaho 291,295, 323 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App. 2014); 2007 Legendary ·Motorcycle, 154 Idaho at 
354, 298 P.3d at 248; see also In re Permit No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho Dep't of Parks & 
Recreation, 121 Idaho 819, 823, 828 P.2d 848, 852 ( 1992). abrogated on other grounds by Verska, 
151 Idaho 889, 265 P .3d 502. 
Here, the statute is not ambiguous. In fact a look at the sheer number of judicial opinions 
written about LC.§ l 8-8002A(2) lends to a clear showing that there has been no problem with Idaho 
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courts understanding that law enforcement officers must give the specified information to drivers 
prior to subjecting them to evidentiary testing. Common sense lends itself to a clear understanding 
that one cannot be informed if they are asleep or unconscious. The term "informed'' is not a difficult 
word, nor is it unique to judicial interpretation. In fact, in other areas of the law, the meaning and 
application of the term ''informed'' has been judiciously sorted out Take, for example, the term 
"informed consent.·· An informed consent can be said to have been given based upon a clear 
appreciation and understanding of the facts, implications, and consequences of an action. To give 
informed consent, the individual concerned must have adequate reasoning faculties and be in 
possession of all relevant facts. In other words, the information one is asked to base their consent 
upon must be communicated in a manner that results in possession of the information. Because she 
was asleep when the ALS advisory form was read to her, Mrs. Bobeck was unable to receive and 
ultimately possess the information conveyed by Trooper Hight. What if Mrs. Bobeck was deaf? 
Would it be reasonable to suggest that the act of reading the ALS form to a deaf person amounts to 
having informed that person as required under the statute? What if Mrs. Bobeck did not speak or 
read the English language? Would it be reasonable to suggest that the act of reading the ALS form 
to a person who cannot understand English nevertheless amounts to having informed that person as 
required under the statute? Under these three scenarios. there is little doubt that it \Vould be absurd 
to determine each was "informed," which is why it cannot be inferred that "informed'' or '"informed 
substantially" actually means"read." Again. if simply reading the ALS form was enough, the statute 
would have stated so. 
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In its Opinion and Order, the District Court made another erroneous determination that to be 
"informed"' as required by either I.C. § 18-8002 or LC. § 18-8002A(2 ), law enforcement need only 
'·substantially provide" the required information to Mrs. Bobeck in order to meet its burden. and that 
merely reading the ALS advisory form to Mrs. Bobeck was enough to amount to '·substantially 
provide." R.. p. 251. Specifically. the District Court held that so long as the required information 
is ·'substantially provided,'' a law enforcement officer meets his burden under LC. § l 8-8002A(2).R., 
p. 235.(emphasis added). Effectually, the District Court materially alters the duty placed upon law 
enforcement officers as proscribed within the statute by replacing '·inform" with "provide.,. As 
applied to the facts at bar, the District Court contends that Trooper Hight complied with his duty 
under I.C. § l 8-8002A(2) because he substantially provided the information to be given to Mrs. 
Bobeck because he read the ALS form to her while was asleep. This holding is without merit and 
erroneous. 
If the act of 0 providing" the information vvas enough, the statute would have stated so. But 
it doesn't. The Supreme Court of The United States has found that a plain meaning determination 
can result from verb tense insomuch that words are to be interpreted according to the proper 
grammatical effect of their arrangement within the statute. Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Director, OWCP, 
519 U.S. 248. 255 ( 1997) (present tense of verb is an element of plain meaning): Dole Food Co. v. 
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,478 (2003) (interpretation required by "plain texC derived from present 
tense). Here, the Legislature used the word "informed," which as used in the statute and 
grammatically speaking, is an adjective. By definition, "informed" means having information or 
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based on possession of information, whereas ·'inform'' means to give information to (someone) or 
to be or provide the essential quality of (something). "Informed" and "Inform:' Merriam-Webster 
Online Dictionary. 2015. http://vvvv,N.merriam-webster.com (30 Mar. 2015) . .. Informed" as used 
within the text of I.C. § 18-8002A(2), is an adjective and as such, requires a noun that can be 
described as having information or possession of information. Here, "the person" is the noun in 
which the adjective ·'informed'' is describing a quality of. The plain language of LC. § l 8-8002A(2) 
clearly outlines that the noun must be described by the adjective, and a person who is a sleep cannot 
to be describe as having information or being in the possession of information. Because an asleep 
person is not able to receive information communicated to them. it cannot logically follow that an 
asleep person is able to be informed. As previously outlined, Mrs. Bobeck clearly established that 
she was asleep and unresponsive at the time the ALS advisory form \Vas read to her. Therefore, 
because Trooper Hight read the ALS form to Mrs. Bobeck while she was asleep, and because she 
was asleep she was unable to receive or possess information, Mrs. Bobeck was was not properly 
informed as required under LC. § l 8-8002A(2). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RELIED ON STATE v. DEWITT 
"WHERE THE HOLDING \VAS OVERRULED AND OTHERWISE NOT APPLICABLE 
TO THIS CASE. 
Mrs. Bobeck, respectfully argues that her administrative license suspension should have been 
vacated, first by Hearing Examiner Skip Carter, and subsequently by the District Court upon judicial 
revievv. This argument is based on the fact both the hearing officer and the District Court rely upon 
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the holding in State v. De Witt to form the foundation for their respective decisions. Specifically, both 
misinterpret the holding in De rVitt and its applicability to the facts of this case. 
The District Court's reliance on State v. DeWitt is inherently problematic because it 
misapplies the holding in De Witt to the facts of this case. The sometimes parallel prosecution of 
drivers under the criminal statute for driving under the influence often interjects confusion 
surrounding the applicability of case law stemming from a criminal prosecution to an administrative 
license suspension. Together, the two administrative license suspension statutes and the criminal 
DUI statute, unfortunately lead to an interpretation so intertwined with case law from both the 
administrative arena and criminal arena that the without a clear grasp of the facts, a misapplication 
of case law and a convoluted analysis can result. That is precisely what happened in this case when 
both the hearing officer and the District Court relied upon the holding in 5,'tate v. De Witt as the 
foundation for the decision. In its opinion rendered in State v. DeWitt, the Court of Appeals 
addresses \Vhether the effect of the defendant's unconsciousness at the time the ALS form was read 
to him, though in violation of LC. § I 8-8002A(2). should also effect the admissibility of the result 
of the test results in a criminal proceeding. 145 Idaho 709,714, 184 P.3d 215,220 (Ct.App.2008). 
The DeWitt Court, in applying the holding from State v. Woole1y, l I 6 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 
1210, 1212 ( 1989), and a then-valid implied consent theory determined that the evidence obtained 
from DeWitt' s blood draw \Vas admissible at in the criminal prosecution for driving under the 
influence because ·'a drunken driver has no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing" and 
"whether or not a police officer gives the required warnings bears nothing on the issue of consent." 
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See DeJYitt, 145 Idaho at 714, 184 P.3d at 220. Importantly, the DeWitt Court made clear that "the 
failure to advise a suspect of the consequences of refusal would be significant only with regard to 
the administrative suspension of the suspect's license following a refusal." Id The Court did not 
address the issue of vvhether De Witt was "informed" or "substantially informed" to the extent it 
would survive a challenge to any Final Order as administered in an administrative hearing. As such, 
the holdings in DelYitt and Woolery cannot be read as a declaration that despite what the statutory 
language provides, under the implied consent laws, there is no right to refuse an evidentiary test and 
therefore it doesn't matter whether or not a driver is informed pursuant to LC. § 18-8002 or§ 18-
8002A(2). If that were the case. it wouldn't follov, that Idaho could have numerous court decisions 
subsequent to De Witt and T,Voolery wherein the very issue of an officer's compliance in rendering 
an advisory under LC. § 18-8002 or§ I 8-8002A(2) determined the outcome. 
For example, in an appeal from the decision in an administrative license suspension case 
Cunningham v. 5itate, the Cornt of Appeals found that there was improper advisement of rights. 150 
Idaho 687. 689-90, 249 P.3d 880, 882-83 (Ct. App. 2011 ). As a result of the improper advisement, 
the refusal was dismissed. Id In the Cunningham decision, the Court of Appeals set out the 
following cases to support its position: Kling v. State, 150 Id 188,245 P.3d 499, (Ct App.) (2010), 
In Re Griffiths. 113 Id 364, 744 P.2d 92, (1987). In Re Beem, 119 Id 289,805 P.2d 495, (Ct. App.) 
(1991), In Re Virgil, 126 Id 946,849 P.2d 182, (Ct. App.) (1995). The Cunningham Court also 
outlined the controlling rule from Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 834, 41 P.3d 257, 262 (2002), 
where our Supreme Court held that"[ m ]otorists who refuse to submit to requested tests are entitled 
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if can hearing they were not 
completely advised according to these code sections. And, pursuant to Griffiths, Virgil, and 
Beem. a driver must only show that he or she was not properly advised of the required information. 
stated in Beem, this Court "has emphatically discountenanced interjection ofjudicial gloss upon 
the legislature's license suspension scheme." Beem. 119 Idaho at 292, 805 P.2d at 498. 
Ultimately, the law in Idaho with regards to the significance of a failure to inform a person 
consequences pursuant to LC. § 18-8002 or § l 8-8002A(2) limits its significance to the 
administrative suspension of the suspect's license following a refusal. DerVitt, 145 Idaho at 714 n. 
4. 184 P.3d at 220 n. 4. The hearing officer and the District Court further erred when both relied 
upon the misinterpretation and application of 5.'tate v. De Witt, De rVitt does not stand for making the 
§ 18-8002A(2) advisory immaterial to an administrative hearing as both the hearing officer and the 
District Court have interpreted from the De Witt decision. Rather. De Witt supports the materiality of 
the § l 8-8002A(2) advisory in the administrative proceeding arena while also limiting its 
significance to the administrative suspension of the suspect's license following a refusal or failure. 
Importantly, De Witt also did not stand for any determination or rule that by simply reading the ALS 
advisory form, an unconscious person is considered "informed." 
It is clear from the extensive Idaho case law on the issue that the law in Idaho regarding the 
significance of a failure to inform a person consequences pursuant to LC. § 18-8002 or § 
18-8002A(2) is limited to the administrative license suspension proceeding. Because this case is a 
proceeding relating to the administrative suspension of Mrs. Bobeck's license, whether or not Mrs. 
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Bobeck \Vas '·informed" or '·substantially informed" prior to performance of the evidentiary test is 
relevant and material, especially when the ultimate outcome of the administrative proceeding can 
be affected by an officer's failure to properly advise a driver pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002 or § l 8-
8002A(2 ). Consequently. both the hearing officer and the District Court's reliance on DeWitt was 
misplaced. A review of the record in this matter. specifically of the uncontroverted testimony of 
Officer Hight. Mr. Bobeck and Mrs. Bobeck clearly shows that Mrs. Bobeck \Vas not informed of 
the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as required in LC. § l 8-8002A(2). Therefore, 
because this is an administrative suspension and the fact Mrs. Bobeck vvas not informed pursuant 
to§ l 8-8002A(2) is significant, the District Court erred in sustaining the license suspension of Mrs. 
Bobeck' s where it misapplied the holding of De Witt and disregarded the necessity of finding Mrs. 
Bobeck was informed pursuant to § l 8-8002A(2). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT BASED ITS DECISION ON THE 
APPLICABILITY OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE BUT THE STATUTE 
WAS OVERRULED AND MRS. BOBECK DID NOT CONSENT TO THE 
EVIDENTIARY BLOOD DRAW. 
The District Court's reliance on State v. DerVitt is further problematic because DeWitt and 
as its progeny State v. Woolery, are no longer good law after this Court declared the implied consent 
statute unconstitutional. State v. Wulff; 157 Idaho 416,337 P.3d 575 (2014). Both the hearing officer 
and the District Court expressly base their respective decisions on a theory of implied consent, 
despite the fact Mrs. Bobeck was not informed as required under LC. § l 8-8002A(2), did not consent 
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to the evidentiary test and the evidentiary blood draw was done without a warrant Because of this, 
both the hearing officer and the District Court erred in not vacating the administrative license 
suspension of Mrs. Bobeck 
The District Court erred by relying on the implied consent statute to further support its 
decision that whether or not Mrs. Bobeck was informed pursuant to J.C. § 18-8002A(2) \Vas 
irrelernnt. The implied consent statute relied upon by the District Court is codified at Idaho Code 
section 18-8002 and provides that a person gives "implied consenf' to evidentiary testing, including 
blood draws. \vhen that person drives on Idaho roads and a police officer has "reasonable grounds 
to believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation 
of[ldaho's DUI statute]:' State v. Wulff: 157 Idaho 416,337 P.3d 575 (2014). In this case, the blood 
obtained from Mrs. Bobeck \Vas done without a warrant, and under Wulff: was in violation of Mrs. 
Bobeck's constitutional rights. As such, the District Court erred in basing its decision upon a 
violation of Mrs. Bo beck's constitutional rights and the now overruled implied consent statute, Mrs. 
Bobeck did not consent to the blood draw because she was unable to receive the information 
contained on the ALS advisory as Trooper Hight read it to her while she was asleep, and the blood 
draw was warrantless. 
Until recently, it was long standing law in Idaho that law enforcement ofiicers do not need 
to obtain a search warrant to force a blood draw of a suspect' s blood stemming from an arrest for 
driving under the influence. This was the product of this Court's holding that forced blood draws fell 
within either of two exceptions to the warrant requirement: ( 1) forced blood draws fall within the 
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exigent circumstances exception as in State v. Woolery; and (2) forced blood draws are valid as 
consent searches under Idaho's implied consent law as in State v. Diaz. Both of these cases, and 
especially the implied consent law are, as discussed below, no longer "good law'· having been 
expressly overruled by this Court in State v. Wulff: 
The theory which underlined the holding of State v. Woolery and State v. Diaz, was that the 
warrant requirement for forced blood draws was excepted due to the exigent circumstance related 
to the dissipation of blood alcohol level and that Idaho's implied consent statute allows warrantless 
blood draws under the consent exception. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,370, 775 P.2d 1210. 
1212 ( 1989); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300. 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). However. the theory that 
a warrantless blood draw is an exigency exception to the \varrant requirement based upon the natural 
dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream was discussed and effectually dismissed, with reliant 
holdings therefore overruled, by the United States Supreme Court in 1Hissouri v. AkNeely. Missouri 
v. 1\lfcNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L Ed. 2d 696 (2013). Following the decision in lvfissouri v. 
1ivfcNeely, this Court in 5:tate v. FVulff extended the McNeely holding finding that the "application 
of the implied-consent statute as a per se exception to the warrant requirement as to blood draws 
violates the Fourth Amendment." State v. Wulff, 157 [daho 416,337 P.3d 575 (2014). 
First in :}fissouri v. ,\;fcNeely, the United States Supreme Court held "warrantless blood 
draws are not always permitted under implied consent statutes" and that '·the natural metabolization 
of alcohol in the bloodstream" does not '"presen[t] a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving 
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cases:· 133 S.Ct. at 1556. Instead, courts must use a '·totality of the circumstances·' approach to 
determine exigent circumstances. Id. Further, the natural dissipation of alcohol in blood is just one 
circumstance, and it must be considered with other factors, such as the ease and speed with which 
the police could get a warrant in the particular case. Id at 1562-1563. Effectually, AkNeely rejects 
the state-court decisions that upheld warrantless blood draws under the "per se exigency" theory. 
Among the rejected state-court cases that the 1\:fcNeely Court cited was this Court's decision in 
Woolery. Id. at 1558 n.2. Consequently, McNeely abrogated Woolery's holding that the natural 
dissipation of alcohol always creates an exigency exception in drunk-driving cases and vVoolery is 
no longer good law. State v. Wulff; No. 41179, 2014 WL 5462564, at 4 (Idaho Oct. 29, 2014). 
Because McNeely rejected the per se exigency theory, the exigent circumstances exception cannot 
justify all warrantless, forced blood draws authorized by Idaho's implied consent law. 
The question thus arises: Can the warrantless, forced blood draws that aren't justified by 
exigent circumstances be justified. instead, by the implied-consent theory upon which this Court 
relied in Diaz and upon \\foch the District Court relied upon in this case? The answer to this 
question, in light State v. Wulff: is no. Prior to State v. vVulff: this Court held that under the implied 
consent statute, warrantless forced blood draws fell within the consent exception to the warrant 
requirement as valid consent serches. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300. 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
Although lvfissouri v. AlcNeely did not directly address whether warrantless forced blood draws 
could be justified by implied consent statutes, the argument that AfcNeely applies only to exigency 
requires a narrow reading of McNeely's holding and one which this Court rejected in State v, Wulff 
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State v. 1Vu(ff; I57 Idaho 4 I 6,420,337 P.3d 575,580 (2014). There, this Court expressly disagreed 
with a narrow reading of McNeely and instead determined that McNeely's overall discussion suggests 
a broader application. Id. This broader application results in this Court finding that reliance on 
implied consent as a valid consent search is no longer acceptable when it operates as a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Ultimately, this Court held that Idaho's implied consent 
statute is an unconstitutional per se exception to the warrant requirement because the statute does 
not recognize a driver's right to revoke his implied consent and effectually overruled Diaz. State v. 
Wulff, 157 Idaho 416,422,337 P.3d 575,582 (2014). 
This Court's holding in Wulff not only invalidates the implied consent statute, but it is now 
the new legal standard to be used when evaluating the constitutionality ofa warrantless forced blood 
draw. The holding in Wul/falso annihilates the legal foundation used by both the hearing officer and 
the District Court where both relied on State v. DdVitt and the implied consent statute to declare 
whether or not Mrs. Bobeck was asleep when the ALS advisory was read to her was immaterial 
because she could not refuse the blood draw, and where Trooper Hight did not obtain a warrant prior 
to directing the extraction of Mrs. Bo beck's blood. Not only was Trooper Hight required to give the 
ALS advisory to Mrs. Bobeck in a way that she "shall be informed" of its contents, but now, under 
State v. Wulff, Mrs. Bobeck did in fact have the option to revoke her implied consent. However, 
because Trooper Hight read Mrs. Bobeck the ALS advisory while she was asleep in violation of LC. 
§ 18-8002A(2) she was not given the opportunity to revoke her consent, and a warrantless blood draw 
commenced. 
APPELLANrS BRIEF -25 
CONCLUSION 
the reasons Appellant Lynn Bobeck, respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the findings of the Hearing Officer and remand the matter back to 
instructions to vacate the suspension of driving privileges. 
DATED this ~~day of April, 2015. 
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